THETRUE

INTEREST

OF THE

PRINCES OF EUROPE,

AT THIS

PRESENT JUNCTURE

IN.

FAMILIAR LETTERS

FROM THEIR

RESPECTIVE COURTS,

TO A

GETLEMAN in ENGLAND:

The INTEREST

Of the Emperor Of the El. of Bavaria Of the K. of Prussia Of Holland Of France Of England

Of SPAIN
Of SWEDEN
Of Muscovy
Of the Court of Rome
Of the Republick of
VENICE.

LONDON:

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William Pulteney, Esq;

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SIR,

OUR Zeal for the Defence of the Rights, Liberties, and Privileges of your Country (to whose Interest you have always appear'd so ready to sacrifice your own) and your ge nerous Opposition to all the ill-concerted Measures of our false Patriots and unskilled Politicians, have induced me to claim your Protestion for this Essay on the true Interest of the Princes of Europe at this Juneture.

Your just Discernment and consummate Experience in political Affairs, are more than sufficient to recommend my Work, if once approved by you; for if the present Administration had followed the different Schemes you have, from Time to Time, laid before them; or consulted

fulted, as you have always done, the Glory of their Prince, and the Welfare of his Subjects; we should not be obliged, at prefert, to copresent those Interests in a Light sa opposite to their natural one. The Blunders, Mijoanniages, Ignorance, and ---- of FAVOURITES, have thrown the political State of Europe into a Sort of Convulsion, of which England, in particular, is so likely to feel the dangerous Symptoms, and which might be prevented yet, if those unskilful Politicians, whose Want of Experience has render'd the Fable of all Europe, could be persuaded to call you into Consultation with them; but Pride and Obstinacy have always been the inseparable Companions of agross Ignorance:

However, Sir, let us make in Concert a last Effort for the Gonversion of those Hereticks in Politicks, and endeavour to convince them, by this general Sketch of the true Interests of the Princes of Europe imperfectly delineated, that it is not ours that should appear in such anoblique View, and that all the faux Jours, which are shewn in it, are owing to their Want of Desterity in the Management of our Affairs, both Foreign and Domestick, and you'll oblige,

From Time to Time, will be on others, of con-

SIR,

Your very humble Servant,



THE TRUE

TEREST


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Princes of Europe, &

The Interest of the EMPEROR, N. S.

Vienna, February 1, 17374

SIR.



ted for their Meridian only, as intirely contrary to the true Interest of a Prince, or of his Subjects, have been lately, by an unexpected Event (which

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our ancient Politicians are pleased to call Fatality) received amongst us; and are likely to create as much Disorder and Confusion in our Councils, as they do in yours.

It is true, Sir, that our German Politicks have never been looked upon by other Nations as a most refined one, especially ever since the Abdication of Charles the Fisth; or our German Ministry thought incorruptible: but however, we had till this present unhappy Juncture, retained so good an Opinion of our selves, to which the vast Success of Charles's glorious Enterprizes had given Birth; that we thought we had still Sense and Discernment enough lest, to make a just Dissertence betwixt the publick Good, and a Shadow of Glory, attended with Affliction and ill Success.

Sensible that it is not the Interest of the illustrious Germanic Body, in General, or of the Emperor in Particular, to leave a full Carier to the
unlimited Ambition of the Musicovites, reckoned
dangerous by the Impoliticks of Charles the
Fifth's Successors, we have been surprized at the
strict Alliance, lately contracted between the two
Courts of Vienna and Petersbourg; neither have
we been capable yet, to understand, upon what
Foundation it is establish'd, with what View cemented, and what great Advantages can accrue
from it to the Roman Empire.

The Muscovites, till their late Legislator Peter the Great, had made little or no Figure in Europe, and were scarcely known but by their Ferocity, Ignorance, and the vast Extent of their Empire, more formidable for its unpaffable Mountains, unpenetrable Forests, and unpracticable Deserts, than by the Number, Courage, or warlike Difpofition of its Inhabitants. Their ambitious Neighbours, especially the Poles and the Swedes, had wrested from them the most beautiful and fertile Provinces they were poffess'd of in that Part of the World, which fome of their Czars had attempted to defend, but always in vain, till Peter, after his Victory at Pultowa, began to draw both the Attention and Respect of all Europe Little fatisfy'd with having re-conquer'd what had been dismember'd from Russia by the Swedes, he had form'd the vast Design of rendering his Empire, in Process of Time, as unlimitted as was his Ambition. He wanted above all, a Footing in Germany; but our late Emperor Foleph, thinking the Neighbourhood of such a warlike enterprizing and ambitious Prince, too dangerous, who in Process of Time could have oppress'd the whole Germanic Body and made himself Emperor opposed it. nothing elle blir famick to

Were the Suspicions and Jealousies of those Times vain and groundless? Or is it less our Interest to confine the Russian Empire within its natural

tural Limits, or have we less to fear at present, from the Ambition of the Court of Petersbourg, than we had then? And if we are in the same Danger, why don't we endeavour to crush the over-growing Power of the Muscovites, rather than render it more formidable to us, by lending a helping Hand toward the Extent of their Conquests? We do it, perhaps, by a Principle of Gratitude for the fignal Services they have done us in the late Election of a King of Poland? But those very pretended Services should have been Suspect to us; since it is the Opinion of the most impartial amongst us, that the Czarina consulted rather her Ambition at that Juncture, than the true Interest of the House of Austria, and was glad of the Opportunity of forcing the Poles to accept a King from her Hands, against their own Inclination, and contrary to the fundamental Laws of the Republick; in Hopes, perhaps, to pave the Way to further Incroachments on their Priveledges and Liberties, and to make some Time or other, their Kingdom a Province of the Russian Empire; which, if it should happen, would be a perpetual Thorn in our Sides not son't to be out to also

who Lecteral Personal and and harloff Emperer, You'll fay, perhaps, Sir, that my Suspicions are nothing elfe but Panick Fears; and that I suppose Things which will never be brought to bear, fince it will always be in the Power of the Emperor, and of the Empire, to hinder the Execution of those Tanga.

fupposed dangerous Projects of the Musicovites, that their Marching their Troops in Poland to support Augustus, can never be attended with such satal Consequences for us, as to have their King in the French Interest, that the Poles have always been thought capable to cope with the Musicovites, to oppose any Invasion on their Sides, or to expel them if once enter'd into Poland.

If my Fears are Panicks, they are, however, grounded upon incontestable Precedents, easily to be found even in this Century; fince we have all the Reason imaginable to believe that Peter the First, would have seiz'd on Poland, instead of re-Storing Augustus, if he had dealt with a less warlike Prince, and had not been afraid of bringing upon him the Arms of the Empire, render'd at that Time, formidable, by its vast and uninterrupted Success against France; what could we expect less, was the Kingdom of Poland divided in fo many Parts at present as it was then? I cannot agree with you, that it will be always in the Emperor's Power to hinder the Muscovites from executing their Projects, especially, if they were affifted by a powerful Ally, which none of their Neighbours will refuse, for the Sake of their Share in the Spoils. As for the Dangers we run by having a King of Poland in the French Interests, you'll give me Leave to fay, that they are chimerical; since we have seen a King of Poland in the French

French Interest, and indebted to France for his Election, such was the late John Sobieski; but we don't know that France has ever reap'd any Benefits by it, or the Empire been the worse for it. I confess, that if a King of Poland was as absolute as the King of France, and could affemble as easily the Pospolite as his Most Christian Majesty does his Armies, one could make a powerful Diversion, while the other, is engaged in a War against the Emperor; but every Body that is acquainted with the Polife Government, knows that is a Thing impossible. The Pospolites are certainly a formidable-Body, which, if once on Horseback, and inspired with an unanimous Spirit of Fidelity to their Prince, and of Sincerity to the true Interest of their Country, could not only cope with the Muscovites, but even make the whole Rushan Empire tremble; but which is very difficult to be effected, amongst People so easy to be bribed by their Neighbours, and always ready to preferve their own private Interest to the Publick Good. Therefore what Influence could the Emperor promise himself to have over them, in Case he wanted their Affiftance to oppose the Enterprizes of the Russians against him, especially when his Imperial Majesty is always in want of the most perfualive Argument, Money?

But we have not only suffered the Musicovites to give Law to Poland, but are likewise entered jointly

jointly with them into a War against the Turks in a Time, and at a Juncture, when we were the less able to pursue it with Vigor, and with some Hopes of Success. Where most of our Electors. jealous, or either diffatisfied at the Steps lately taken by our Court for to procure the Empire to the Duke of Loraine, were so little inclinable to furnish their Contingent; and when the Imperial Treasure had been exhausted, by a late and unfuccessful War against France. We expected, perhaps, that our Arms would have been attended with the same Success as they had been when we made the advantageous Treaty of Pak farowitz; but Prince Eugene is no more, and we want Money, fo justly called the Nerve of War-No doubt but we have flattered our felves from the Beginning, that we should have raised Contributions enough, in the Enemy's Country, to subfift our Troops, but have been unhappily difappointed: We depended, also, for Troops and Money, on our faithful Ally the Czarina, in whose Behalf we have imprudently undertaken this destructive War; but we have not seen yet that her Forces have been able to join ours, though the had found Means to fend them against France upon the Rhine; perhaps, because at that Time the wanted to make her Troops acquainted with the Roads of Germany, when at present she finds it is enough for her to make what Conquests she san on the Side of Turky, which is more to her Conve-

Conveniency, which she can the easier keep and defend, and to which the Emperor could or would not lay any Claim, and leave him to do the same on his Side, in Hopes, perhaps, he would meet with more Difficulties; for her Czarian Majesty knows but too well, that it is not her Interest that the Turks should be crushed by the Emperor. As for Money, I have never heard yet, that the Philosopher's Stone has been found in Russia; and it is surprising to me, considering the Revenue of the Russian Empire; the Cearing should find enough to supply her vast Expences, far from being capable to affift her Allies that Way: Therefore every Thing rightly confidered, it is his Imperial Majefty's Interest, to make as soon as posfible, if not an advantageous, at least an honourable Peace with the Turks; least by another unfortunate Campaigne, he should be forced to make a very dishonourable one; and leave the Czarina to purfue a War, which her Ambition has made her undertake fo fcandaloufly, and in which we have had the Imprudence to affift her. Her Succours in the Affairs of Poland, in which the minded more her own Interest, as I have proved heretofore, than ours, will never be worth the Shift we are daily put to, by taking her Part against the Turks; or ever answer the considerable Losses we have met with in our feveral Campaigns of both Men and Places. We should have flayed fill our Finances had been repaired, before we

had ventured to have any Difference with the Turks; laid hold of the pacifick Dispositions in which his fublime Highnels feemed to be toward us, to have prevented an open Rupture. The Porte, little Politick as she is, must nevertheless have been aftonished to see us espouse with so much Warmth, the Interest of a Nation; contrary to our natural one; what will our natural Allies fay, when they fee us forced to mortgage to France, Luxembourg and Part of the Netherlands, which had always ferved as a Barrier to the exorbitant Power, and unlimited Ambition of that Crown, for a Sum of Money, to enable us to purfue this expensive War? And what will become then of the Ballance of Europe? And of what Signification is it to be for the future, the Alliance of the Dutch kept in Awe by so formidable a Neighbour, who, thereby, will be Mafler of the Keys of their Country?

If it is objected that we have no Need to Care for their future State, since by the last Treaty of Vienna, all the Jealousies and Differences between us and France being settled, we are not likely to want so soon the Assistance of the Dutch, or any other of those Allies, by whom we have been so shamefully abandon'd in our late War with that Grown; I'll answer, that there is very little Foundation to be made upon Treaties so extraordinary in their Nature. That the different Pretensions?

Lelocilly-

of the two Houses of Austrich and France, have always been thought, even by the most skilful and experienced Ministers, of such Kind, as never to be amicably accommodated. That it is not furprizing that the French, feem at present so tractable, and so prone to enter into our Measures, when they are likely to gain, Sans Coups ferir, as they call it, a free Passage into the very Bowels of Germany; where they have wanted so long to gain the upper Hand. That rendering them intirely Masters of the Rhine on their Side under their bare Promise, they will not attempt further, is a very feeble Bar toward their croffing that River whenever they please, and have a Mind to give Law in the Empire in Gratitude, for that extraordinary Piece of Condescension, or rather Generosity. They are Guarantees of the Pragmatick Santtion; but how could they have refused it upon fuch advantageous Terms? and who knows but they may make Use of what we grant them at present, to be nearer at Hand to hinder the Execution thereof? and who can blame them, were we even to render them Mafters of the whole Empire? Since, volenti non fit injuria; I should rather think them very unwife to refuse any Advantages offered to them on any Condition, or Confideration whatfoever. Our Ministers at prefent, are so well persuaded that the French would make a Scruple of Conscience to break the most infignificant Articles of a Treaty, that they feem disposed

disposed to yield to them, without the least Jealoufy, what has cost us, for many Ages past, so many Millions of Men and Money to defend against them. Some pretend that the French Louis d'or, have a very great Influence over our Councils. and that all these miraculous Variations are owing to the extraordinary Qualities, of that Magnet, in which they are followed by some other Ministers in Christendom, who, like them, sell their Country, and pocket the Price thereof. Others fay, on the contrary, that our Ministers are actuated by no other Motives than of being revenged of our antient Allies, for their Inaction in our late War with France, when it was fo much their own Interest to preserve to us the Possession of those two Kingdoms we have loft in Italy; but rather than to take upon me to decide that Controversy, I chuse to finish my Letter, by affuring you that I am.

SIR,

Yours, &cc.

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The INTEREST of the ELECTORS of the Empire.

The INTEREST of the Elector of Bavaria.

S I R, Munich Feb. 22, 1739.

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UR Prince Elector looks with as much Indifference upon what's transacting at the Courts of Vienna, Verfailles, and Madrid, (in all Appear-

ance contrary to his Interest) as if it no Way concerned his Electoral Highness. All Europe thought that the illustrious House of Bavaria, stood very fair for the Empire at this Emperor's Demise, who is very likely to dye without Issue Male; especially when there are already two other Princes of the same House in the College of the Electors; and could have expected to fee his Election supported by France, and the other Princes of the Empire, whom that Crown could have brought into her Measures; but all our Electors Hopes

Hopes on that Side seemed entirely vanished, by the Conclusion of the late Treaty of Vienna. Though, perhaps, his Electoral Highness may think otherwise, and look upon that Treaty as a mere Farce, occasioned by the Necessity of the Times, and which might be fucceeded by a bloody Tragedy, in Case France was called upon at the Emperor's Death to fulfill her Engagements with the House of Lorain. Therefore the Duke of Bavaria must think within himself, that he stands still the same Chance he did, before the Guaranty of the Pragmatick Sanction, by his most Christian Majesty; which I am the more apt to believe, because the Court of Munich seem as much as ever inflamed by that of Versailles, and animated by the Spirit of the old Cardinal; which could not be, if his Electoral Highness thought his Interest entirely abandoned by his Eminence, fince every Body knows that his chief Dependance for his Election for the Imperial Throne, is on that Side. His Backwardness to fend his Contingent to the Emperor's Affiftance into Hungary, is a certain Proof, that he entertains yet the same Hopes which hindered him from fending his Troops upon the Rhine, and engaged him to protest against our late War with France. Time alone will shew if my Conjectures are just, and convince you of the Sincerity with which I am,

SIR,

Entirely yours, &cc.

The INTEREST of the King of Prussia, Elector of Brandenbourg.

SIR,

Berlin, March 1, 1739.

T feems as if our King had no other Interest than to affemble from all Parts of the World an Army of Gyants, as if he would renew one time or other the old Quarrel, of those unfizable Gentlemen against the Gods. For I don't see what any other View he can have for keeping fo long on Foot, and in Time of Peace, fo formidable an Army: Unless it was to cause some Jealoufy to his Neighbours, especially the Dutch, who do not feem overfond of his Majesty's Neighbourhood; and would be better pleased to see him keep at some Distance from them, than to have him so near a Neighbour; though the King of Prussia is of a contrary Opinion, and thinks it his Interest to be within the Call of their High Mightinesses; rather, perhaps, to oppress when the Occasion serves, than to affift them, if oppressed by some Body else; for then in all Likelihood, his Prussian Majesty would endeavour to get his Share of the Spoils; of which the States General are so conscious, that they find always fome Subterfuge to evade, on all Occasions, espoufing. 44

fing his Interest, as it plainly appears in the Affair of Bergue and Juliers.

It has been for a long While rumour'd amongst us, that his Prussian Majesty has entertain'd some Thoughts of the Empire, which might prove vain without the Help of so formidable an Army; and even with it, I cannot but think them very ridiculous; but let it be how it will, I am, nevertheless,

SIR,

The INTEREST of Holland.

SIR, Hague, March 12, 1739.

THE Dutch themselves had always thought, till lately, that their true and real Interest consisted in desending themselves against the Ambition of France, and, by siding with England, help that Crown to keep in her own Hands the Ballance of Europe; but their late Conduct seems very contrary to those Principles, and leave us Room to think, that their High Mightinesses, having consulted their Ephemerides, have found that their

their Government was come to its last Period. The wrong Measures they have enter'd into; their falle Politicks in trufting too far, or depending too blindly on the Sincerity and repeated Affurances of Friendship of a Court, from which they have all to fear; their Imprudence in deferting their natural Allies, are the Forerunners of a Revolution in their State. They find that a too long Series of Prosperity grows, at last, as burthensome as a too long one of Adverfity. The Dutch have been too long happy; like some of their Neighbours, they are surfeited with that Liberty, which their Ancestors had purchased at the Price of their Blood, and thought an inestimable Jewel. They are looking for their old Chains in Spain, and hope that France will be fo complaifant to order that they might fit them to a T, and a la mode. Tho' there are amonst us some old stiff-necked Butter-Boxes, whotoo much begotted to the Fashion of their Country, would not like fuch gay Equipage.

All Europe thought that the Marrige of the Prince of Orange with the Princess Royal of England, would have restored the mutual Considence which had so long subsisted between the two Nations, and which seem'd to have turn'd into a Sort of Jealousy ever since the Accession of the illustriations House of Hanover to the Throne of Great Britain. The Prince of Orange himself thoughts

his Interest in the States strengthen'd by that Alliance; and the English Ministry expected thereby to gain a greater Influence over their Councils: but it has happen'd otherwise, since the Coldness between them at present seems rather greater than ever; and they have shewn so great an Aversion even to the very Name of a Stadt bolder, ever fince King William's Death, that tho' his Most Serene Highness the present Prince' of Orange is a Prince of a rare and diffinguish'd Merit, he has nevertheless lost more Ground in Holland, and appeared more suspected to their High Mightinesses since his Marriage, than heretofore; and the English Ministry has made so poor a Figure for these twenty Years past, and has acquired so little Reputation in Europe, that the States, rather than have the Scandal of being thought influenced by it, or enter into its blundering Meafures, have preferr'd to throw themselves, at all Events, into the Arms of their natural Enemies. Every Body elle would have follow'd their Example in such a Case; for none but Mules would with Affes; but very few would refuse to subscribe themselves.

Dear SIR;

Your's, &sec.

The INTEREST of France.

8 IR, Versailles, March 18, 1739.

UR Interest is to render ourselves formidable by our Arms, or by our Politicks; the one extends the Limits of our Frontiers, and the other, weakens our Enemies by fowing Diffidence and Jealoufy amongst them, and fetting them often together by the Ears. The first has been conducted with an incredible Success, and in all Ages, ever fince the Establishment of the French Monarchy, by the most warlike of our Princes. and the second managed with great Dexterity, by our most wise and skilful Ministers; tho' we have not the ridiculous Vanity, like some of our Neighbours, to think ourfelves the bravest Nation in the World, or either invincible, tho' we are not the most witty People; our vast Conquests, and the many Victories gain'd over our Enemies, even when all join'd against us, is a convincing Proof that we have Courage enough, if not to beat two of equal Strength with us, at least to cope with the Bravest amongst them; and our Treaties and Negotiations fo fuccessfully conducted, shew we have Wit enough to confult our own Interest, and often to outwit them all.

Our late King Louis XIV. did make Use of those two Expedients to strengthen his Interest,

and until the latter End of his Reign, when unhappily wrapt up in an old weak Woman's Petticoat, carry'd both with incredible Success. Brave in his Person he preferr'd no Body in those fortunate Days to the Command of his Armies, but Heroes like himself, and uncommonly wise; he trusted no other Ministers but those he had known, by a long Experience capable to manage under him the Affairs of his Kingdom: On that firm Foundation he had establish'd all his Interest and Glory; and the prodigious great Defign he had form'd of extending his Empire as far as its antient Limits under the fecond Race of our Kings; for tho', Jealousy had represented that Project, glorious in itself, as the Effect of our Ambition out of Measure, and even of the greatest Injustice, Louis XIV. had, however, no other View, than to conquer what had been dismember'd, from the French Monarchy.

His illustrious Successor our present King Louis XV. whom we can justly call the Father of his People, and francorum Dilicia, sensible that a War, let it be ever so prosperous, always gives a very dangerous Wound to the State, which nothing else but Length of Time can heal, struck with Admiration, at the courageous Intrepedity and warlike Humour of his Great Grandsather and Predecessor, has thought it more agreeable to his own private Happiness, and his Subjects Felicity, to

affert his, and their Interest, by pacifick than violent Means, and his Majesty has not been srufstrated in his Expectation; for without Blows, and without exposing the Lives of his most faithful Subjects, (as dear to him, as his own) assisted therein by the most dexterous, most wise, most impartial, and most disinterested Minister, that has ever set at the Helm of the French Assairs; he has accomplish'd, by Treaty, what all the Strength of a powerful Nation had lest impersest.

The Cardinal Fleury, whose Memory will be bless'd among us, as long as the French Monarchy shall subsist, and as long as there will be a true Frenchman lest upon Earth, has by an affiduous and indesatigable Labour, sound the Secret to reconcile all Spaniards to diffipate those rank Jealousies which had so long subsisted between us and other Nations, and to make the most inveterate Enemies of the French Name enter into his Measures, and sinding Means at the same Time, to render them as jealous of each other, as they had ever been of us.

Persuaded that the Execution of our best concerted Measures, would always meet with some Difficulty, as long as the Ballance of Europe should be in other Hands, his Eminence, has cajoled them out of it, who for a considerable Time had claim'd an undoubted Right to it; and when

which could be expected from it. Since at present the Cardinal's Will, or Command, is of a greater Ethicacy amongst our Neighbours, than was the most formidable of our Armies, under Conde, Turenne, Luxembourg, Vandome, Catinat, &c. &c. in the late Reign.

The House of Austrich, which had always been our Rival in Glory, and had always thought her Interests incompatible with ours, believes them at present, by the ardinal's Dexterity, to be equally the same; tho', perhaps, our Minister is of a contrary Opinion, at least, some of our Politicians think so; tor say They, if his Eminence is sin, cere in his Alliance with the Emperor, why does he defer fo long the Conclusion of the Peace, between his Imperial Majesty and the Turks? Since it is in his Power to put a finishing Hand to it whenever he pleases. To which I could answer, that it is rather an Effect of the Defire that his Eminence has of being revenged of the Czarina's Conduct in Poland, than of his Want of Sincerity for the Emperor, fince, had his Imperial Majesty abandon'd that Prince's Interest (which in no Ways square with his own) as so often sollicited to it by our Court, the Peace had been a long While ago concluded between him and the Turks, even to his Advantage and Satisfaction.

Tis true that the Cardinal has diverted the Emperor of two Kingdoms in Italy; but without retaining the least Part of it, he has invested with it a Prince of Spain, from which those Dominions had been dismember'd. Besides, it was against the Interest of most of the Princes of Exrope, and of France in Particular, that the Em peror should be so powerful in those Parts; even his natural Allies, by their Inaction, while they could have hinder'd that Conquest, seem'd to be icalous of it. His Eminence had put his Imperial Majesty's Dominions in his Ballance, and had found them too weighty: Nay, even at present, the Cardinal does not think them within their just Limits, and would not be forcy, perhaps, that one or two more Campaigns in Hungary should force the Emperor to mortgage to France Part of the Netherlands for a Sum of Money. I am fure that it is much the Interest of our Court, as the only Means to keep the Dutch in Awe, at which they are so much alarmed, that his Eminence want. ed all his Skill to calm their Fears; he has even enchanted them fo far, as to render them indifferent toward the Admission of French Troops into Bergues and Juliers, to secure the Possession of that State to the House of Sultzbach, and to render them deaf to the repeated Instances of the King of Pru/sia, who claims a Right to it. I fay to secure the Possession, because that Restriction of few Years, till all Difference might be ami-· catly

cably accomodated, is only an Evalion, of no Weight among our more refined Politicians.

His Eminence, by making our King Guarantee of the Pragmatick Sanction, feems, in that Point to have deviated from our true Interest, fince it is intirely against it, that a Prince of the House of Lorain should be Emperor, who, at that Time, would be very apt to revoke what he had been obliged to yield to the Necessity of the Times; and endeavour to regain by his Arms, what he had loft by a few Strokes of his Pen. Yes, but who shall be Guarantee of the Execution of that Guarantee of the Pragmatick Sanction on the Part of France, especially if we find in Time, that it might prove contrary to our Interest? What his Eminence has done, for the Acquisition of Lorain, and perhaps of some other State contiguous to it. we might be apt to undo, for the Preservation of it, unless we find Means to guard ourselves on that Side against all Attempts whatsoever, so that we could have nothing to fear from the Emperor: fince no Prince have ever thought themselves bound by Treaties any longer than it suited their own Interest.

His Eminence's Conduct towards our Court is represented here in a various Light; for some of us believe, that the great Harmony and strict Union which seemingly subsist between the two Crowns, is owing to the ancient Friendship which has so long subsisted between the two illustrious Houses of France and Hanover; and that none of our Kings will ever undertake any Thing which could prejudice that Friendship, as long as a Prince of that House shall sit on the Throne of Great Britain unless his Britannick Majesty break the Union sirst, and be the first Aggressor.

Others, on the contrary, pretend, that there is no Sincerity in that Friendship; and that our Cardinal has only made Use of it to render England fospected to its natural Allies, that his Eminence might the easier dividere, & Imperare; which once accomplish'd, he will put in Execution some Projects very disadvantageous to the English Nation: For, fay they, if this was not our Cardinal's Defign, why should he have taken so much Pains to deter England, in Part by Promises, and in Part by Menaces, from assisting the Emperor. during the late War in Italy, when the had guaranteed, by the most solemn Treaties, the Possession of the Dominions ravish'd, at that Time, from his Imperial Majesty, since he knew percettly well, that such Breach of Faith on the Part of Great Britain, would cause a Jealousy, and set the Courts of London and Vienna at Varience? And confequently render it the easier for him to gain the Emperor on his Side; which we know has fucceeded to his Wishes. A very difficult Task, if evei

ever there was one, which no French Minister had ever dared to attempt before; and which none but the Cardinal Fleury could ever have managed with such Dexterity; and so happily perfected. Tho' we all know very well, that if once we could break what is call'd the Grand Alliance, we might be able to crush every one of the Grand Allies, in their Turn; yet none of the most skilful of our Ministers had ever entertain'd the Hope of bringing into our Measures the Principal of that Grand Alliance, and in whose Defence chiefly it had been concluded; such Coup de Maitre, was reserved for his Eminence.

Another Tract of confummate Politicks in our Cardinal, is, his having laid the Foundation for France to ingross, together with Spain, and in Process of Time, the whole Commerce of the Levant, by rendering themselves Masters of the best Ports in the Mediterranean. Therefore, if his Eminence's preferring his Royal Mafter's Interest to all other Confiderations whatfoever, is a convincing Proof of the Sincerity of his Friendship for you, we are certainly in the Wrong to call it in Question; but if, on the contrary, all I have heretofore alledged, join'd to the great Care he has taken ever fince he has been declared first Minister of France, to have continued, at the Head of your Affairs, a Person, who, by a long Series of Blunders and Miscarriages, had already incurred

incurred the publick Hatred, and has fince found the Secret to revive amongst you the Spirit of Party, which seem'd almost dorment; and if, agreeable to his Predecessors Politicks, by blowing the Fire, it appears, that the Cardinal has no other Design than to make that Friendship subservient to his Designs, I do not see what great Advantages the English Nation might expect to reap from it; unless it be the Honour of becoming, one Time or other, a Province to France; which would procure me that of calling you Friends, Countrymen, and Fellow-Citizens; and myself then, more than ever,

SIR,

Your's, &c.

The INTEREST of England.

SIR, Versailles, March 25, 1739.

A S you have been pleased to inform me late.

ly, that you are asraid at this critical

Juncture, to declare too openly your Sentiments,
on the present Situation of your foreign or dome
stick Affairs, lest you should be chaced by a Pack

of Greybounds, which the Ministerial Huntsman P—— n, is always putting upon the Scent; I am sure that you will not be sorry, to know, what we think of it on this Side of the Water.

You must be inform'd, then, Sir, that I belong to a Society, which, from the first of its Establishment, till of late Years, had entertain'd a most advantageous Opinion of the Wifdom, Prudence, Sagacity, and Politicks of an English Ministry; but which your late Transactions have changed into the greatest Contempt; the most devoted amongst us, to the English Interest, for we are call'd here, francois Englifies, or Englifes, are struck dumb when we mention the Prefent Posture of Affairs, and when ever we are urged to declare our Sentiments upon it, with both our Hands and Eyes, lifted up to Heaven, we answer no otherwise than by this Exclamation, Ob les Grands Asnes! Ob les Grandes Bestes! and then, fall again into our former Reverie without proceeding any farther.

Others less bigotted to the English Interest, take the Cudgel and endeavour to make a Recapitulation (intermix'd now and then with a scornful Smile) of all your M—rs Miscarriages and Blunders (as they are pleased to call them) ever since they have been at the Helm of your Affairs; they enlarge especially upon that Affair of Sicily,

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in 1718, when Sir George Bing, your Admiral, attack'd the Spaniards, while your Ambassador at Madrid, was making the most folemn Protestations, that you was to appear there, at that Juncture, only as Mediators; which Affair, they call Perfidy and a scandalous Breach of the Publick Faith given; and which has (as they pretend) occafion'd that Inveteracy, and implacable Animofity sublisting at present between the two Nations, thinking it impossible ever to bring the Spaniards to a fincere Reconciliation, till they have been thoroughly revenged of it; which they have attempted ever fince, and which they will effect at any Rate; for (continue our Politicians) have not the Spaniards, ever fince, endeavour'd to render their Commerce precarious, both in the Mediterranean and on the Atlantick Ocean, by plundering or feizing their Merchants Ships? Have they not fince by their frequent Alarms, put the English Nation, to the vast Expences of equipping large Squadrons, and all to no Purpose? Have they not ever fince been employ'd in finding Ways and Means to transport the Commerce the English used to drive with them to the French Nation? And have they not at last accomplish'd it? Where was the Wisdom of the English M-y, while those Projects, so opposite to the Interest of their Country, were transacting? Was it asleep? And, if not, why did they not exert all their Might to defeat them? But no; they have afted as if they

they had been resolved to consult any other Interest but their own, (I mean that of their Nation,) or rather, as if they would sacrifice the Interest of England to all others: For, in 1718, they thought the Preservation of the Emperor's Dominions in Italy of so great Consequence to them, that they even set then their Nation's Honour and Reputation at a Venture, and laid one of the best Branches of their Commerce at Stake, for to run to his Assistance; and, in 1734, those very same Estates appear'd as insignificant to the English M—rs as their Honour and Reputation.

I could not help fiding with those ill-natured Gentlemen, in that Particular; for in Fact it was the Interest of the English to secure, by their Arms, as well as they had done by Treaties, the Possession of those States to the Emperor, unless the Ministry was resolved to render France and Spain still more formidable in those Parts, and to throw intirely into the Hands of those two Nations their own Commerce to the Levant, and in the Mediterranean Sea; which Inconvenience could not have been met with, while his Imperial Majefty had been Master of the two Sicilies; fince England had nothing to fear from his Power at Sea which cannot be faid of France, Spain, and the King of Naples join'd together; neither could the Emperor have ever been suspected to have the least Inclination (confidering the Jealousy which must have unavoidably subsisted between him, France.

France, and Spain,) to join with those two Powers, or either of them, to interrupt our Commerce in those Seas; which, as Matters stand at present, through the Indolence, Imprudence, ill Politicks (not to fay worse) of your Minister, must be, in Process of Time, intirely destroy'd. For what can protect it, your Acquisitions, or Conquests in those Parts? But alas! how feeble are the Succours you can draw from thence, when compared to the united Strength of France and Spain, who can have always a formidable Fleet, which they can equip on the Mediterranean, and Supply with Men and Provisions, when you must be forced to fetch your Ships and Ammunition of all Kind from England. Besides, how long will you be Mafters of Minorca and Gibraltar, when once' all Europe, at least the most fromidable Powers in it, will be bent to deposses you of them? I know the English are brave, that they are very powerful by Sea; but they are not invincible; And they are to encounter with Foes not inferior to them in Courage; and they must agree with me, that Fortune decides as often the Fate of Battles, as Undauntedness and Bravery; and if once they have a Check in the Streights, they must return to England to refit; while their Encmies can do it upon the Spot, and appear in two or three Weeks as formidable as ever.

It was then your Interest, Sir, to prevent the growing of those dangerous Evils, by timely affilting

fifting the Emperor, when attack'd in Traly by the French and Spaniards; but, instead of that, you have not only seen, unconcern'd, Naples and Sicily wrested from him, but, with the same Indifference, seen him likewise throw himself into the Arms of France, and conclude with it and Spain a Treaty which should alarm all Europe.

Is it not through the Confidence of that Treaty that Spain has, at prefent, the prefumptuous Temerity to infult your Flag, and lord it over you, as if you were obliged to receive Laws from its you, fays the brave Englishman, whom, twenty Years ago, a Spaniard had not dared to look in the Face? But how can you help it? The Ignorance, or - of your M-r has render'd the Wound incurable. For if even you was to attempt, at present, to change Foils, and enter into a War with Spain, as the whole Nation feems inclinable, how could you do it with the least Hopes of Success? Your M--r himself confeffes, that you have no Allies to be depended upon; for it cannot be reasonably supposed, that France would desert the Emperor and Spain, with whom she has lately contracted so strict and advantageous an Alliance, to take your Part; especially when it is so much against her own Interest. Befides, who knows but that Treaty might be concluded to your entire Destruction; for you have not yet forgot that for ever memorable one of Partition, made under your late King William; and Heaven forbid, for your own Sake, that the one should be attended with better Success than was the other.

The Dutch are so well hook'd in, and so much kept in Awe by their Neighbours, that they dare not stir, if even they had the greatest Inclination to assist you, lest, by a wrong Step, they should run the Risque of being swallow'd up: And who knows but the King of Spain waits for so savourable an Opportunity, to seize on those Provinces, which have revolted from the Spanish Monarchy.

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Money is the Sinews of the War; but, if I am rightly inform'd, you have fpent fo much, for these late Years, in secret Services, that you have little or none left; and you have been so backward in paying your Debts, that I don't believe you'll find any Body very forward to lend you more. You have a vast Number of Ships, it is true, and perhaps Men enough to arm a formidable Fleet; but will those Ships go upon the dry Land; or are your Enemies obliged to man another, on Purpole to have the Honour of being beaten by you? Or to oppose an Invasion of their Country, while, on the contrary, the Fate of yours depends on that of a Sea Fight, fince there is always a confiderable Party amongst you, ready to fide with the Invader.

No Doubt but your Men have Courage enough; but they have languish'd so long in the Indolency of an uninterrupted Peace, that they must want that Experience, so absolutely requisite to fight with Success; which the French and Spaniards have acquired by frequent Skirmishes with their Enemies: Therefore it would be almost Presumptious in you to flatter yourselves with the Hopes of a successful War, unless, by a Change in your Ministry, you regain the Considence of your ancient and natural Allies; set your Finances on a better Footing, by restoring the publick Credit; and calm the intestine Divisions, which weaken the State.

I am,

SIR, Your's, &c.

The INTEREST of Spain.

SIR.

Madrid, April 1, 1739

I F you follow exactly, Step by Step, all the Measures of the Court of Madrid, ever since the first Time the samous Cardinal Alberons was set at the Helm of the Spanish Administration, you'll find that his Catholick Majesty has shad no other View, than to regain, by his Arms,

or by Treaty, what had been dismember'd, from Time to Time, from the Spanish Monarchy, in order to form out of it separate Dominions for the Princes his Children, for sear (as he expected to be bless'd with a numerous Posterity) the Ambition, so natural to Princes of living independent, should force them to form some Projects contrary to each others Interests.

The Fleet which you destroy'd, on the Coast of Sicily, was design'd to dislodge the Emperor out of that Kingdom; and the Miscarriage of that Enterprize, at that Time, did not discourage the Court of Madrid so far, as to make her lay it entirely aside. Mean while, the whole Spanish Nation was so enraged at the unexpected Conduct of your Ministry, which they call'd persidious, that they had proposed to themselves several Expedients, as well to be revenged, as to put you entirely out of Power to make use, at any other Time, of such violent Mediation; and sinding, after many srivolous Attempts, they could not accomplish their Designs, they had Recourse to crasty political Means.

Their first Project of that Kind, was to alarm you for several Years, with the intended Introduction of Don Carlos in Italy; which, at first, was thought so contrary to your Interest, by your Ministers and the ministerial Emissaries, that

the British Nation was as much terrify'd by their Clamours on that Subject, as if the Fate of the three Kingdoms had been at Stake. The Parliament was teized by long and repeated Speeches and the Nation lull'd afleep by their-political Essays, till those amongst you (who, on all Occasions, have appear'd the most zealous for the Interest of their Country, and had appear'd unconcern'd as long as they had feen no Danger, finding that the Court of Spain was in earnest, and entirely bent upon that Expedition) began to chime with the Ministry, and find as many Inconveniecies in the Introduction of Don Carlos into Italy: For though your Ministers, by a Spirit of Contradiction, or inflamed by fomething else-, began to alter their Tone; and, far from finding that Introduction contrary to the English Interest; or to that of their Allies, they left no Stone unturn'd till they had brought the Emperor (contrary to his Interest) to consent to it; and we have seen at last, those same Squadrons, fitted out before to oppose it, bring Don Carlos in Triumph into Italy, under the bare, or rather frivolous Promifes, that he should attempt no farther than the Succession of Parma, Placentia, and the Great Dukedom of Tuscany; though your Ministers must have been conscious, that such Promises extorted by them from his Catholick Majesty, to plaister their treacherous, or impolitical Conduct, should be no longer facred to him, than he could find

the Opportunity to break it. The Death of the late King of Poland happening soon after, offer'd him a very savourable one; for the King of Spain joining with France, who stood for King Stanislaus, and the Emperor savouring the Election of the Elector of Saxony; Don Carlos, powerfully affisted by the French and the King of Sardinia, and the Emperor deserted by England and Holland, reconquer'd, in sew Weeks, the two slourishing Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, whose Conquest had cost so much Blood to the Grand Alliance.

A less ambitious Princess than the Queen of Spain could have been satisfy'd, by having so well provided for the present, for her Darling. But no; the carried her Pretentions still further, and carried an underhand Intrigue at the Court of Vienna, in the Time of the War, to patch up a fecret Peace with the Emperor, on Condition, that Don Carlos should marry the eldest Archdutchess, that, at his Imperial Majesty's Death, he might be elected Empery; but that Princess being, at that Time, betroathed to the Luke of Lorain, and the Queen o Spain's Mine sprung up by her Allies, she was forced, at last, to act in Concert with them, and expect from a Treaty, Part of which she had endeavourd to gain by Finess, and which will be the Consequence of the last concluded at Vienna, be tween the Emperor, France, Spain, and the King of Sardinia; for Don Philip will be likewise introduced

duced into Italy, even in Spight of all your Armaments; if, contrary to your modern Politicks, you would venture to oppose it (unless you prefer to it the Honour of lending a helping Hand to that Prince, as you have already done to his Sicilian Majesty) the Grand Duke of Tuscany shall be obliged to buy the Interest of France and Spain at the dear Rate of his Dominions in Italy. out of which, and some other States which might be guess'd at, shall be erected a Kingdom of Lombardy for Don Philip. If the Island of Corfica is to be made a Province of it; or if France defigns to keep it in her own Hands, Time alone will determine; though I am apt to believe that Corfica will be made Part of the Portion of Madame de France.

No Doubt but his Catholick Majesty will likewise renew his Pretensions (and that very soon on Minorca and Gibraltar, which 'tis neither his Interest, or that of the Princes of Italy, it should remain in your Hands; since, in Time of War, you could keep there a powerful Fleet, to alarm continually their Coasts.

The Dutch seem apprehensive (and well they may) that their Turn will come next; as being the Interest of the King of Spain to recall those Rebels to their former Obedience; and it is with the greater Reluctance I am obliged to tell them, that I see their Government expiring.

It is likewise, with as little Pleasure, that I find myfelf obliged in Honour to forewarn you, that in spight of your late Convention, his Catholick Majesty will never renounce the pretended Right he claims to fearch your Ships in the West Indies. that his feeming present Condescention is only to gain Time; and that your intended Treaty will never be brought to a happy Conclusion; and all through the ill Management, Blunders, and Mifcarriages of your too wife M----rs: For had the Conclusion of the late Treaty of Vienna preceded the Signature of the Conventions, you had never been put to the Trouble of voting pro and con in your Parliament, and never been tantalized with the Hopes of a speedy Satisfaction for the Spanish Depredations, to which the Court of Madrid had never any the least Propensity. I wish, for your Sake, the had as much as I have to declare my felf,

SIR.

Entirely Your's, &c.

The INTEREST of Sweden.

SIR, Stockholm, April 15, 1739.

THE chief Interest of Sweden, at present, is to endeavour to regain the Provinces difmember'd from it by the Muscovites, in the unfortunate Days of Charles XIIth's Reign; and as the the Swedes find France ready, by a Spirit of Revenge, to affift them in that glorious Enterprize, they are not to be blamed for laying hold of fo favourable an Opportunity. 'Tis not at all furprizing they have preferr'd the advantageous Offers of the French Court to yours, fince they know you fo peaceably inclined, that nothing with your Help could ever be transacted, but by Mediation, Plenipoes, grand Plot, Conventions, Treaties, and I don't know what elfe, which after many Conferences, and an Army of Meffengers, and Couriers dispatch'd on each Side, would at last take their ordinary Course, i. e. vanish into Smoak, and have no Effect, as all your Negociations have done for these twenty Years past. They think Bellona's Voice, and Mars's Thunder a far more perfualive Argument. I wish I could as easily convince you, that I am,

SIR,

Your's, &c.

P. S. Our King has been, of late, in such a precarious State of Health, that his Majesty is, at present, seldom seen in Publick. He has been subject (as pretended) to very violent Fits of the Gravel, which oblige him to keep his Chamber, and often his Bed; but I am of Opinion, that his greatest Distemper lies at his Heart, and assets his Mind; and that he is more chagrin at the visible Decay of his Interest in Sweden, than at that of

his Constitution; for in Fact who can his Mas jesty bear with Patience, that the fingle Suspicion of being in the Interest of the House of Hesse, is fufficient to give the Exclusion from the Senate: and to fee his Favourites in that Affembly fup. planted by the Duke of Holstein's Partizans, supported by France, whose Ministers govern at prefent with as absolute a Power at Stockholm, as they do at most of the principal Courts of Eurepe, in fpight of all the Oppositions of Russia, Denmark. and England, who would be better pleased to see our present King succeeded by a Prince of his House, than by the Duke, who has so many Claims upon each of those three Nations, and could make them good, in case he had once the Power in his Hands, which is his unquestionable Right, as being Son of the eldest Sister of Charles the XIIth? Besides, his Royal Highness could then, perhaps, defeat all the Measures concerted by the present Czarina to preserve the Succession to the Throne of Russia to the House of Courland; for every Body knows that he married the eldest Daughter of Peter the Great, and has a Prince by her. Since the same Will that call'd the Princess of Courland to that Throne, declares the Dutchess of Holftein-Gottorp, and her Heirs, her Successors; and it is certainly the Interest of France to Support the Interest of that injured Prince, as the most efficatious Means to clip the ambitious Wings of

the Russians, and to set just Limits to their overgrowing Empire.

The Interest of Russia.

SIR,

Petersbourg, May 1, 1739.

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TE are much afraid here, that the easy Conquest of Asoph will cost a great deal more than we expected at first, or that really it is worth. I do not know what Business we had to break with the Turks, for a Place which we know very well we could not keep long; and which, if it could not be wrested from us by Force, we should be obliged to surrender by a Treaty. Our Empress, flush'd with her Success in Poland, had, perhaps, flatter'd herself with the Hopes of extending her Conquests on that Side as far as Adrianople, if not farther; but she has found that Enterprize not so easy in the Execution, as she had expected. The Incursions of General Lasey into Tartary have been very chargeable to Ruffia, both for Men and M ney, and of no Profit. Ce. neral Munich gain'd Oczakow, which we have been forced to abandon; but has never dared to

attempt Bender: And the Truth is, that from all our Skirmishes with the Turks, we always came out like Trivelin, avec les Estivierres. We would be glad at present, perhaps, to flip our Necks out of the Collar; but how, and which Way to do it with Honour, is what's unknown to us. Our Ministers pretend that it was our Interest to begin this War with the Turks; and I wish they could make good their Affertion by the Success of our Arms. I chuse rather to think it was our Ambition, puffed up by some Advantages, which have gain'd us a Number of powerful Enemies, and caused some Outrages to our Friends and Allies; therefore we had acted a great deal wifer, if we had not fo scrupulously consulted that pretended Interest, which has put our Neighbours in Mind, that it was theirs to undertake something very opposite to our natural and real one: for had we fat still, or contented ourselves with palming a King upon the Polanders (fince we were resolved to do it) we had not given Occasion to the Swedes (by the Disappointments we have met with on the Side of Turky) to meditate the Recovery of the Provinces they loft to us after the Battle of Pultowa. Likely enough but we depend upon powerful Succours from England; but will France consent to it? And if not, as they never will, what will become of us, when affaulted at once by the Turks and Swedes by Land, and block'd up by Sea by the confederate federate Fleets of France and Sweden? Shall not we be forced to confeis then, that it had been more our Interest to content ourselves with what we had got, than to be exposed to lose all, by extending our ambitious Views farther. I wish our Ministers had had, at that Time, a small Share of the pacifick Disposition of Yours; and would be convinced, that I am,

SIR,

Entirely yours, &c.

The Interest of the Court of Rome.

SIR,

May 10, 1739.

WHEN I consider that Christ, when conversing amongst us, often declared, that his Kingdom was not of this World; and that denying here that the Pope is his Vicar upon Earth, is an Heresy of the first Class, a high Road to the Inquisition, and smells much of the Faggot: Methinks his Holiness should have no Interest but that of his Divine Master, which is

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a spiritual one; or any other Ambition, like St Paul, Gloriari in cruce Domini; but when I see the Sovereign Pontiff surrounded with Satellites, raising Armies, intriguing at all the Courts of Europe, endeavouring to enlarge his Dominions by Policy, or open Force (tho his Divine Master had not always so much as a Place to rest his sacred Head upon) and claiming a Supremacy over the Temporality of Kings and Sovereign Princes, I am entirely at a Loss, and leave you to think what you please, provided you do not question the Sincerity with which I am,

SIR,

Your very humble,

and obedient Servant, &c.

The INTEREST of the Republick of Venice.

SIR,

Venice, April 1:, 1739.

THE extraordinary Events which happen'd in Europe by the unexpected Death of the late King of Poland, and which have ferved as a Pre-

text for France and Spain's invading Italy, had a little disconcerted the noble and majestick Gravity of . our Senators; and our ancient Politicks fo much admired by all other States of Europe, which are the Basis of ours at present, and without which it feems almost impossible our Republick should long subsist in its flourishing Condition, were thought to be embarraffed, at that Time, with some very difficult Problems. We were a little perplex'd to see ourselves environed, all on a sudden, with the Armies of two Powers, who make little or no Scruple of feizing, if poffible, on every Thing they find to their Purpose; and have always shew'd themselves deaf to all Intreaties or Arguments, let them be ever so artfully concerted, when they can retort with their more perfuafive Cannon. The Adriatick, and her dear Spouse, were alarmed at that impending Storm, which was so likely to disturb their conjugal Union, if not to divorce them for ever. The Peace which succeeded afterwards, and that apparant Reconciliation betwixt the contending Parties, has not been capable yet to restore our former domestick Tranquility; for tho' the Tempest did make but very little Havock on our Land, yet it broke very near us. The Alliance concluded between the Emperor and the Czarina, threw us into a new Dilemma, worse than the first. His Imperial Majesty claims from us the Performance of our former Engagements with him; the

the Porce affored us of the Continuation of her Friendship, in case we were to continue Neuter; threatening us, at the same Time, with an immediate Invasion, if we were so imprudent as to espoule the Quarrel of the Agressors. The Popepressed us earnestly to join our Arms to those of those two Christian Princes, against the common Enemy of the Christian Name; but we knew perfeetly well that France and Spain were of a contrary Opinion; and, though it was not our Interest to disablige either of those Powers, much less to enter into a War against the Turks, in which we know by Experience we must be always Losers, we have chose to keep them all in Suspence, till we can see what Part France (who has always had a great Influence over the Turkiffs Ministers ever since Cardinal Richeleu) should act in that Affair; for fear, by running too rashly to the Emperer's Affiffance, we should have chanced to provoke her to patch up a Treaty between his Imperial Majeste and his sublime Highness, and Jeave us in the Lurch; and then we must have been forced to purchase a Peace at the dear Rate of Part of our Dominions, or of some immense Sums of Money, which it is not in our Power to pay at present; for it will never be our Interest to attack the Turks, or to provoke them to attack us, were we even fare of a powerful Affiliance, which we cannot expect but from the Emperor, and which, at that unhappy Juncture of his Affairs, it must have

have been his Interest to resuse us: Therefore, Sir, it must be ours likewise, at present, (hook'd in as we are on all Sides, by so many somidable Enemies, who would be glad; perhaps, to find a Pretext to swallow us up) to sit still and be quiet; unless we should rather chuse to become a Province of the intended Kingdom of Lumbardy. Too happy yet, if, without the least Provocation, we can escape that satal Blow, and some other powerful Evils, a ttracted by the irresistible Charms of the Adriatick, don't attempt to break the conjugal Knot, and defile the Marriage-Bed of our Doge. Time alone will prove if my Conjectures are Just, and convince you that I am,

SIR.

Your most humble, and Obedient Servant, &c.

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